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Abstract 
 
 
Recently van De Van, Creedy and Lambert (2001) and Lambert and Urban (2005) have reconsidered the 
original Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) decomposition of the redistributive effect in order to 
individuate the optimal bandwidth that should be used in decomposing the redistributive effect when 
groups with close pre-tax incomes are considered. The methodology proposed by van De Van, Creedy 
and Lambert (2001) suggests choosing as the optimal bandwidth the one which maximizes the ratio 
between the potential effect V (which depends on the bandwidth) and the actual redistributive effect RE 
(which is invariant). Lambert and Urban (2005) discuss a set of further possible decompositions of the 
redistributive effect together with a decomposition of the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index into three 
terms. In this paper we want to contribute to throw some more light on the behavior of three of the main 
decompositions analyzed by Lambert and Urban (2005) in order to look for criteria for the choice of a 
bandwidth which allows the three different definitions of potential redistributive effect to assume as 
coherent as possible values and, in the meanwhile, to catch as much as possible of the potential vertical 
effect. We suggest looking for the bandwidth (or for a set of bandwidths) where the maximum distance 
among the different potential vertical effects is minimum, provided that the greatest of the three indexes is 
not lower than the global maximum assumed by the lowest of them, over the whole income distribution 
range. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Decomposing redistributive effect across groups of pre-tax equals into vertical, 
horizontal and reranking effect has been intensively studied in the last years. The 
original work by Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), henceforth AJL, considers 
exact pre-tax equals in portioning the pre-tax income distribution. 
As van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001), henceforth VCL, pointed out, in the real 
word taxation this is not the case: only groups with close pre-tax incomes can be 
considered. They got through this problem in order to individuate the optimal 
bandwidth that should be used in decomposing the redistributive effect. Therefore, VCL 
methodology suggests choosing as the optimal bandwidth the one which maximizes the 
ratio between the potential effect (which depends on the bandwidth) and the actual 
redistributive effect (which is invariant). Here a problem arises as this ratio may have 
more than one relative maximum and presents a layout which may be irregular, and 
somewhere quite irregular; as a consequence, identifying univocally the maximum is 
not so obvious (Vernizzi and Pellegrino 2007). 
Lambert and Urban (2005), henceforth LU, present an exhaustive discussion on a 
complete set of possible redistributive effect decompositions, and introducing new 
indexes based on the taxation of close equals by their average tax rate. 
In this work we desire to contribute to VCL and LU discussion with some suggestions 
about the choice of a convenient bandwidth, by intensively looking to the empirical 
analysis. We would conclude to look for the bandwidth (or for a set of bandwidths) 
where the maximum distance among the considered possible definitions of potential 
vertical effect is minimum, provided that the greatest of the three indexes is not lower 
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than the global maximum assumed by the lowest of the three indexes over the whole 
income distribution range. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we recall how the original AJL 
decomposition should be applied in the real world where strict equals groups are rare 
and, consequently, they must be replaced by “close equals” groups; to overcome this 
problem, according to LU’s suggestions, alternative RE decompositions are introduced 
together with the decomposition of the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index (henceforth 
APKR )1. In section 3 we report the values the indexes assume at bandwidth limits, that is 
either when the bandwidth tend to zero or when it cover the whole income distribution 
range; then we sketch some preliminary a priori considerations about some aspects of 
their behavior. The empirical behavior of indexes is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 
discusses whenever a bandwidth with “optimal” or at least “desirable” properties can be 
identified. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Redistribution and reranking indexes 
 
Let yG  and TyG −  be the Gini index on the gross and net incomes respectively. The 
redistributive index RE is equal to Tyy GGRE −−= . It is well-known that the Gini 
coefficient fails to decompose across subgroups into between and within group 
inequality components in case subgroup income ranges overlap. When considering the 
pre-tax income parade, if groups are selected in a sequential order, such that pooling all 
groups incomes are in a non decreasing order, we have that B Wy y yG G G= + , where ByG  
                                                 
1 The decomposition of RAPK is described and discussed in Urban and Lambert (2005); for further details see Vernizzi (2007). 
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is the between-group Gini pre-tax index and WyG  is the within-group Gini pre-tax 
index2. However, if post-tax income groups contain the same subjects they did before 
taxation, it is no longer granted that the after tax maximum value in the i-th group is not 
greater than the minimum value in the 1+i -th group and that no intersection (or 
overlapping) effect appears among groups. 
If taxation induces overlapping among groups, the post-tax Gini index becomes 
B W t
y T y T y T y TG G G G− − − −= + + , where 3 ( )t AJL B Wy T y T y T y TG R G G G− − − −= = − + . 
When exact equals are considered 
In their seminal paper, AJL not only organize groups so that no overlapping effect exists 
for pre-tax groups, but also implicitly assume that for the after-tax income parade (i) the 
group averages maintain the same ranking as before taxation and (ii) the within group 
orderings remain the same as before taxation. If this is the case, the post-tax 
concentration index (evaluated when post-tax incomes are ordered according to the 
order they had before taxation) is ( )B Wy T y TG G− −+ , so that AJL APKR R= , being APKR  the 
Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani reranking index4. 
                                                 
2 ByG  is the Gini index for pre-tax incomes when within each group all incomes are substituted by their group average; 
, ,
W
y k y k y
k
G a G= ∑ , where ,k yG  is the Gini index for the k-th group and ,k ya  is the product of the k-th group  population share and 
pre-tax income share. 
3 By TG −  and , ,Wy T k y T k y T
k
G a G− − −= ∑  are the analog forms for ByG  and WyG  when incomes have been taxed; in particular ,k y Ta −  
is the product of the k-th group population share and post-tax income share. ty TG −  is what Dagum (1997) calls “the transvariation 
term”. In UL notation 4
AJL
y TR G D−= − , where 4 B Wy T y TD G G− −= +  is the concentration index for the after tax income parade, 
ordered according to non decreasing group averages and, within each group, in a non decreasing order. The relations which involves 
Gini and concentration indexes components are analyzed, e.g., in Vernizzi (2007). 
4 In UL notation 1D  is the concentration index for after-tax incomes, when ordered according to the before taxation ranking. 1D  
may be different from 4
B W
y T y TD G G− −= +  and, in general, it is. In our notation 1D  is y TD − . 
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If we split yG  and TyG −  into the above described components, as AJL do, the 
redistributive effect can be written as ( ) ( )B B W W APKy y T y T yRE G G G G R− −= − − − − . A 
further simplification can be applied when the analysis is limited to the case in which 
the population groups contain exact pre-tax equals, which implies 0=WyG  and 
y
B
y GG = . In this case the redistributive effect can be expressed as 
( )B W APKy y T y TRE G G G R− −= − − − . 
AJL name ( )By y TG G −−  the vertical potential redistributive which looses part of its 
potentiality whenever either the within-group inequality index W TyG −  or the group 
overlapping index ( )AJL t B Wy T y T y T y TR G G G G− − − −= = − + APKR=  becomes different from 
zero after taxation. 
When close equals are considered 
However, as observed before, this decomposition can be correctly applied provided that 
each group is composed by subjects with the same pre-tax income and taxation does not 
modify either the ranking among group averages or the within-group rankings (van de 
Ven, Creedy and Lambert, 2001; Urban and Lambert, 2005; Vernizzi, 2006). 
In the real world, even for gross incomes, the within-group Gini index, WyG , is generally 
different from zero, as only groups with close pre-tax incomes can be considered. As a 
consequence, only bandwidths of income containing close-equals must be chosen. 
Being more general, neither post-tax group means maintain the same order they had for 
the pre-tax income parade nor, within each group, the order of the incomes remains 
unchanged in the transition from the pre- to the post-tax incomes; in this case the 
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residual of the RE decomposition is generally not equal to the APK index, whichcan be 
more generally defined as ( )APK B Wy T y T y T y T y TR G D G D D− − − − −= − = − + . y TD −  is the 
concentration index for the post-tax income parade when incomes are ranked according 
the pre-tax income non-decreasing ranking; By TD −  and 
W
y TD −  are, respectively, the 
between and the within group concentration indexes for post-tax income parade5. We 
can confirm these violations using a SHIW dataset, even if the magnitude of these 
unpleasant outcomes depends on the income range (bandwidth) chosen for each group. 
It is worth to stress that, according to empirical evidence6, the income bandwidth acts in 
opposite directions towards group reranking and within-group reranking: the larger the 
bandwidth is, the less probable is the former and the more frequent happens to be the 
latter. 
In addition, as the bandwidth increases, WyG  can be no more close to zero, so that the 
redistributive effect can be no more evaluated as 
RE = ( )B W APKy y T y TG G G R− −− − − ( )B B W APKy y T y TG G G R− −= − − − ; it becomes more realistic 
to turn back to the more complete decomposition 
 ( ) ( )B B W W AJL VCL VCL AJLy y T y T yRE G G G G R V H R− −= − − − − = − −    (1) 
having defined ( )VCL B By y TV G G −= −  and VCL W Wy T yH G G−= − . 
When using the above decomposition, one gives back the idea of constituting close-
equals groups, and focuses on the eventual enlargement of the within-group inequality 
                                                 
5 By TD −  is defined as the concentration index when all incomes inside each group are substituted by the group income average and, 
moreover, groups are ordered according to pre-tax group averages. , ,
W
y T k y T k y T
k
D a D− − −= ∑ , where ,k y TD −  is the concentration 
index for the k-th group, when after tax incomes are ordered according to their pre-tax order,  and ,k y Ta −  is the product of the k-th 
group  population share and post-tax income share. 
6 Lambert and Urban (2005), Vernizzi and Pellegrino (2007).  
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( )W W VCLy T yG G H− − =  term, together with the group overlapping term AJLR , to measure 
the loss in potential vertical redistribution effect which is measured by 
( )B B VCLy y TG G V−− = . 
UL present other RE decompositions which holds also either when groups do not 
include just equals or between or within groups rerankings are introduced by taxation. 
Here we shall consider two of these decompositions, both of them apply the idea of 
smoothed taxation within group, which is introduced by UL in coherence with the 
principle of close equals groups: if groups contain close equals, their incomes should be 
taxed by a same tax rate, which can be properly estimated by the group average tax rate. 
After having applied a same tax rate to all incomes in group k, the Gini index for group 
k remains exactly equal to the pre-tax ,k yG ; however the smoothed within group Gini 
index , ,
SW
y T k y T k y
k
G a G− −=∑  is generally different from , ,Wy k y k y
k
G a G=∑ , because in 
general , ,k y k y Ta a −≠ . 
UL define AJL AJL AJLRE V H R= − − , where ( )AJL B SWy y T y TV G G G− −= − +  and 
AJL W SW
y T y TH G G− −= − , so that: 
 ( ) ( )AJL AJL AJL B SW W SW AJLy y T y T y T y TRE V H R G G G G G R− − − −= − − = − − − − −  (2) 
In expression (2) the potential vertical effect is measured by the difference between the 
pre-tax Gini index and the Gini index for an artificial post tax income parade, which, by 
constructions, excludes any group overlapping7. 
                                                 
7 UL define AJLV  and AJLH  in an apparently different way. They define 5D  and 6D  as concentration indexes calculated on 
smoothed net incomes: the 5D  index ranks groups according to the same order they had before taxation, even if the taxation 
changed the income average order among groups; the 6D  index ranks groups that are ranked in a non decreasing order with respect 
 7
The “pure” horizontal inequity is measured by the enlargement of within group 
inequality, with respect to what would induce a smoothed taxation; group overlapping 
introduced by taxation, is measured by AJLR  as in equation (1). 
Both expression (1) and (2) keep into account only a part of horizontal inequity, 
eventually introduced by a taxation system, in fact the two RE decompositions do not 
consider within group and between group eventual rerankings. Actually, the Atkinson-
Plotnick-Kakwani index APKR  can be decomposed into three terms 8: 
APK AJL EG WGR R R R= + + .  Together with the overlapping term AJLR  which has been 
already described, there are two further terms: the former, EGR , measures the horizontal 
inequity due to the reranking of the mean post-tax income among groups, whilst WGR  
measures the reranking effect due to within groups reshuffling. More in detail 9 
EG B B
y T y TR G D− −= −  and WG W Wy T y TR G D− −= − . 
The latter UL decomposition we consider is APKRE V H R= − − , where 
( )B SWy y T y TV G D G− −= − +  and W SWy T y TH D G− −= − .  Then:  
 ( ) ( )APK B SW W SW APKy y T y T y T y TRE V H R G D G D G R− − − −= − − = − − − − −   (3) 
UL notice that decomposition (3) has the advantage of synthesizing the whole 
information set into one equation10. Table 1 summarizes Gini and concentration indexes 
definitions. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                                                                                                                                               
to their post-tax average incomes. 3D  is the concentration index for (non-smoothed) after tax incomes, when groups follow the 
same order as before taxation, whilst within group incomes are in non decreasing order; then 6
AJL
yV G D= −  and 
4 6 3 5
AJLH D D D D= − = − . 
8 Lambert and Urban (2005). See also Vernizzi (2006) for analytical details. 
9 UL define 4 3
EGR D D= −  and  3 1WGR D D= − . 
10 UL define V and H, respectively, as 5yV G D= −  and 1 5H D D= − . 
 8
What decomposition is more suitable to analyze the redistributive effect and what 
bandwidth should be chosen is a problem not definitely solved: VCL suggest choosing a 
bandwidth where ( )VCLV RE  is maximum. This ratio may have more than one relative 
maximum and presents a layout which may be irregular, and somewhere quite irregular; 
as a consequence, identifying univocally the maximum is not so obvious. We got 
through this problem. 
3. A priori considerations on indexes behavior 
 
On a priori considerations, we can easily state the values that the here considered 
indexes assume at bandwidth limits, that is either when bandwidth tends to zero or the 
maximum available range (Table 2). 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
When the bandwidth tends to zero, VCL AJLV V RE= = , y y TV G D −= −  (the Reynolds-
Smolenky total redistribution index) and 0VCL AJLH H H= = = ; it follows that at 
bandwidth zero VCL AJLV V V≥ = . Conversely, when the bandwidth is maximum, that is 
equal to the observed income range, 0VCL AJLV V V= = = , VCL AJLH H RE= = −  and 
( )y y TH G D −= − − , so that when the bandwidth coincides with the maximum range 
VCL AJLH H H≤ = . In what it concerns the reranking effects, we have that when the 
bandwidth is zero 0AJL WGR R= =  and EG APKR R= , whilst for maximum bandwidth 
0AJL EGR R= =  and WG APKR R= . 
The difference AJLV V−  is equal to EGR , which being non-negative, implies V  to 
dominate AJLV . Less evident is the relation between VCLV  and AJLV  and, especially, that 
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between V  and VCLV : in fact VCL AJL SW Wy T yV V G G−− = −  and 
( )VCL EG SW Wy T yV V R G G−− = − − . 
In order to throw some light on these relations, we recall how WyG  and 
SW
y TG −  can be 
represented as weighted sums of average absolute differences, calculated within each 
group: 
 
( ) ( )
2
,2
2
,2
1
2
1 1
2 1
K
W
y i y i
i
K
SW
y T i y i i
i
G n
n
G t n
n t
µ
µ−
= ∆
= ∆ −−
∑
∑
 (4) 
where µ is the average income for the whole subjects considered in the sample, n is the 
number of equivalent subjects in the sample, ni is the number of equivalent subjects 11 in 
group k, ti is the i-th group average tax rate, t  is average tax rate for the whole sample, 
( ) ( )2, , , , ,
1
2
i ik k
i y i i h i s i s i h
s h s
n y y n n
= >
∆ = −∑∑ , having defined with ki the number of cases 
registered in group i and with ni,s the weight associated to income yi; within each group 
incomes are ranked in a non decreasing order. We can then write: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
,2
1
2
,2
1
1
1
1
2 1
K
SW W
y T y i y i i i
i
K
i y i i
i
G G G n t t
n t
t t n
n t
µµ
µ
−
=
=
− = − =−
= ∆ −−
∑
∑
   (5) 
Due to the asymmetry of income distributions, which makes bandwidths in the left tail 
to be more crowded than those in the right tail, in (5) positive ( )it t− ’s, are likely to 
                                                 
11 A sum of equivalent subjects may be a non integer number. 
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receive a weight more than proportional than the negative ( )it t− ’s; if this is the case, 
VCLV  is expected to be not lower than AJLV 12. 
Turning to V  and VCLV , the sign of the difference VCLV V−  depends on the difference 
( )EG SW Wy T yR G G−− − , where SW Wy T yG G− −  is likely non negative, due to the above 
considerations, and EGR  is surely non-negative. So, on a priori considerations, we can 
but conclude that for the bandwidth tending to zero VCLV V−  has APKR  as its limit, and 
for the bandwidth tending to the maximum range, VCLV V−  has zero as its limit. 
Turning now to the horizontal loss measures, we observe that AJLH H−  is equal to 
WGR , the within group reranking index13, which is non-negative and that the difference 
between  VCLH H−  is equal to the sum of WGR  and ( )SW Wy T yG G− − : being the former 
always non-negative and the latter likely non negative, we expect that  AJLH H≥ , 
moreover given that ( )SW Wy T yG G− −  is non-negative, VCLH  should be not lower than 
AJLH , so that, summarizing, we expect that VCL AJLH H H≥ ≥ , where the second 
inequality always holds. 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we investigate by an empirical analysis how the group bandwidth 
influences the components of the redistribution index VCLV , VCLH  and AJLR  in equation 
                                                 
12 For instance when the income range is split into two groups, each having the same spread but not necessarily the same number of 
subjects, being ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2t t n t n n nµ µ µ µ= + +  and assuming that ∆1,y=∆2,y=∆·,y, we can write 
( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }2 2 2, 1 1 2 21 1SW Wy T y yG G n t t t n t t nµ− ⋅⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− = − ⋅ ∆ − + − =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ( ){ } ( )2 2 1 1 2 1 21 1n t n n n nµ µ µ⎡ ⎤− ⋅ −⎣ ⎦  which is greater than zero if 
1 2n n> . 
13 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2, ,2 21 1
1 11 1
2 1 1
K K
WG W W APK
y T y T i y T i y T i i i i i i i
i i
R G D G D n t R n t
n t n t
µ µµ µ− − − −= == − = − − = −− −∑ ∑ , having defined with Ri
APK 
the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani for the i-th group. 
 11
(1), AJLV  and AJLH  in equation (2), and V  in equation (3), together with the 
components of the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index APK AJL EG WGR R R R= + + . 
As stated before, our aim is either to contribute to the discussion about the choice of a 
proper bandwidth: a proper bandwidth should catch as much as possible of the potential 
redistributive effect and, in the meanwhile, should get as close as possible measures 
from the three indexes VCLV , AJLV  and V . 
Our experiment was conducted on the basis of the Bank of Italy survey on households 
incomes and wealth (SHIW). The 2004 Italian SHIW dataset provides demographic and 
post-tax income microdata for a representative cross-section of 12,713 taxpayers and 
8,012 households (20,581 individuals). This data were used to obtain gross and net 
incomes according to the Italian Personal Income Tax (Pellegrino, 2007b). In order to 
deal in some way with two different data bases, the experiment was conducted with 
respect to both individual and family equivalent incomes. Equivalent incomes were 
obtained by dividing total family incomes by an equivalence scale; the scale here 
adopted is the Cutler scale which can be expressed as ( )h h hCS NA NC= + βα , having 
(arbitrarily) set 0.5=α  and 0.65=β . Ebert and Moyes (2000) observe that, in 
applying equivalence scales, the choice of the weight may be arbitrary: we consequently 
decided to weigh equivalent incomes by the lower and the upper bound, the former 
being 114 and the latter being the component number associated to each family15. Once 
the 2004 gross income parade was obtained, the 2006 and 2007 distributions were 
estimated considering the impact of the inflation rate (Pellegrino, 2007c). We found that 
results are quite analogous either for weights equal to family components or for all 
                                                 
14 0α β= = . 
15 1α β= = . 
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weights equal to 1; moreover, results are also very similar across years, so that, for the 
sake of simplification, here we only report results referred to year 2004, for individuals 
and for household equivalent incomes - weight 116. Figures 1 and 1bis show the 
behavior of the three potential redistributive effects, VCLV , AJLV  and V, are plotted 
together with the constant line of the Reynolds-Smolenky total redistributive effect. 
The three indexes which measure the loss in horizontal equity, VCLH , AJLH  and H, are 
reported in Figure 2 and 2bis, together with AJLR  and APKR , the latter being constant; 
all the above measures are expressed as percentages of the redistributive effect RE. 
The decomposition of APKR  is represented in Figure 3 and 3bis: AJLR , EGR  and WGR  
are there expressed as percentages of APKR . 
As we noticed in the previous section, in correspondence of a zero bandwidth, both 
VCLV  and AJLV  are equal to RE, whilst V is equal to  y y TG D −− , the Reynolds-
Smolensky redistribution index, which is greater than RE.  For our minimum 
bandwidth, which is 10 euro large, in Figure 1 VCLV  and AJLV  show a 0.7 % increase 
(0.8 % when dealing with family equivalent incomes: Figure 1bis) with respect to the 
limit value for the bandwidth tending to zero, that is RE. Both  Figure 1 the two lines 
are not distinguishable and show a steep ascent up to bandwidths around 300 euro large; 
then AJLV  leaves VCLV  and becomes undistinguishable from V  for bandwidths larger 
than 400, when considering individuals, and larger than 550-600 when considering 
family equivalent incomes. V shows a decreasing trend; before becoming 
undistinguishable from AJLV  it dominates VCLV  and AJLV , then the V line crosses VCLV  
and continues descending together with AJLV , leaving  the VCLV  line above. When the 
                                                 
16 Even if limited to VVCL, HVCL, RAJL, REG and RWG, Vernizzi and Pellegrino (2007) reports all graphs for the three tax systems (2004, 
2004 and 2006), concerning both individuals and family equivalent incomes (weight 1 and weight equal to family components). 
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bandwidth is 3,000 euro large, for individuals the three lines are still greater than RE: 
VCLV  is almost 1.0% greater than  RE (1.2% families), AJLV  and V are only 0.4% greater 
than RE (0.6% families). 
Even if our analysis tries to focus on small bandwidths than LU do, our findings are 
substantially consistent with LU results; what appears to be different is that the lines 
presented by LU look much more regular the ones here represented. Our lines are the 
more irregular the more they depart from the axes origin: the irregularities are more 
similar to irregular waves than to completely random white noises. 
More in detail, we observe that: 
(i) VCL AJLV V   as long as SW Wy T yG G−   ; VCLV  becomes greater than AJLV  when SWy TG −  
becomes sensibly greater than WyG ;  
(ii) AJLV V   after EGR  becomes 0  ; as long as EGR  is not negligible AJLV V< ; 
(iii) VCLV V   for bandwidths where ( )EG SW Wy T yR G G− −  ; VCLV V<  as long as 
( )EG SW Wy T yR G G−> −  and, conversely, VCLV V>  after EGR  becomes lower than 
( )SW Wy T yG G− − . 
FIGURES 1-2bis ABOUT HERE 
Figure 2 and 2bis represent the behavior of the three indexes which measures the 
horizontal effect, together with AJLR , the overlapping index, and APKR , the global 
reranking index; as it is expected, the three indexes here considered, VCLH , AJLH  and H, 
assume a value which is very close to zero when the bandwidth is 10 euro large. H 
presents few and insignificant positive values just for the tiniest bandwidth; then it starts 
a descending trend towards the limit value ( )y y TG D −− − . Conversely in correspondence 
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of bandwidths 10-3,000 large, here considered, VCLH  and AJLH  always present positive 
values. In particular when the bandwidth is 3,000 euro large, VCLH  looks to be still 
increasing, whilst AJLH  has already started the descending trend. Similarly to VCLV , 
AJLV  and V, when bandwidths become large, VCLH , AJLH  and H present relatively 
strong irregularities. 
FIGURES 3-3bis ABOUT HERE 
The decomposition of APKR  is represented in Figure 3 and 3bis: AJLR , EGR  and WGR  
are expressed as percentages of APKR . AJLR , which is zero both at bandwidth zero and 
at bandwidth maximum, shows a quite asymmetric line (as it could be noticed also from 
Figures 2-2bis, where it has just been rescaled by APKR RE ): for individuals, at 10 euro 
bandwidth it has already jumped up to 67% of APKR  (58% for families) and it reaches 
its maximum value, 88%, at the 100 euro bandwidth (86% for families)  then it begins 
to descend and  at a 3,000 euro bandwidth it is roughly at a 25% of APKR . EGR , which 
coincides with is APKR  when the bandwidth is a point bandwidth, is 32,4% of APKR  at 
the 10 euro bandwidth (40% for families); it decreases quite soon and at a 300 euro 
bandwidth is already less that 1% of APKR . WGR appears to be a direct function of  the 
bandwidth, even if at decreasing rates: at a 3,000 bandwidth it is nearly 80% of APKR  
(70% for families).  Similarly to what happens for the potential vertical indexes and the 
horizontal iniquity indexes, as bandwidths becomes large, AJLR  and WGR  present 
relatively strong irregularities: which does happen for EGR , due to the fact that this 
index is quite low for large bandwidths. 
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To better investigate the behavior of VCLH , AJLH  and H, we recall expression (4) where 
W
yG  and 
SW
y TG −  and 
W
yG  were represented as weighted sums of average absolute 
differences, calculated within each group: moreover we can similarly define Wy TG −  as 
  
 ( )
2
,2
1
2 1
K
W
y T i y T i
i
G n
n tµ− −= ∆− ∑  (6) 
  
From (4) and (6) it follows that we can represent VCLH  as: 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
2 2
, ,2 2
1
2
, ,2
1
1
1
1 1
2 1
K
VCL W W i i i i i
y T y i y T i y
i
K
i y T i y i
i
n t nH G G G G
n t n
t n
n t
µ µ
µ µ
µ
− −
=
−
=
⎛ ⎞−= − = − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎡ ⎤= ∆ − ∆ −⎣ ⎦−
∑
∑
 (7) 
and AJLH  as: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
2
, , 2
1
2
, ,2
1
1 1
2 1
K
AJL W SW i i
y T y T i y T i y
i
K
i y T i y i i
i
nH G G G G
n
t n
n t
µ
µ
µ
− − −
=
−
=
= − = − =
⎡ ⎤= ∆ − ∆ −⎣ ⎦−
∑
∑
 (8) 
For lower income groups, where the tax rate for each subject may be much lower than 
t , ,i y T−∆  may be greater than ( ), 1i y t∆ − , even if , ,i y T i y−∆ ≤ ∆  which may cause VCLH  
to result positive: in fact due to the asymmetry of income distributions, it is likely that 
lower income intervals contain more subjects than higher income groups do, so that the 
weighed sum represented in (5) may result to be positive even if , , ,i y T i y k−∆ ≤ ∆ ∀  . 
Then we can conclude that the VCLH  remains positive until bandwidths are large enough 
to make a sufficient number of ,i y T−∆ ’s –especially in the left hand side of the 
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distribution-  small enough to be less than their corresponding pre-tax ,i y∆ , multiplied 
by ( )1 t− 17.  
When dealing with incomes in the right distribution queue, the contrary happens, but, 
due to the distribution asymmetry, in the left hand tail income groups generally present 
weights greater than those in the right hand tail. 
Turning now to AJLH , being for lower incomes ( ) ( )1 1it t− ≥ − , in the left distribution 
queue, the relation ( ), , 1i y T i y it−∆ ≤ ∆ −  is more likely to be verified than the relation 
( ), , 1i y T i y t−∆ ≤ ∆ − .  this consideration should explain why AJLH  starts to decrease 
much before than VCLH . In any case it is excluded that AJLH  is positive when all groups 
post-tax Gini indexes  are lower than the corresponding pre-tax ones. 
Let’s now define ( ) ( )2, , , , ,
1
2
i ik k
D
i y T i i h i s i s i h
s h s
n y y n n−
= >
∆ = −∑∑ % % , where ,i hy%  is net income for 
subject h in group i, being incomes here ordered according to pre-tax ranking; we can 
now express H as: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
2
, , 2
1
2
, ,2
1
1
1
1 1
2 1
K
W SW i i i
y T y T i y T i y
i
K
D
i y T i y i i
i
n t
H D G D G
n t
t n
n t
µ
µ
µ
− − −
=
−
=
−= − = − =−
⎡ ⎤= ∆ − ∆ −⎣ ⎦−
∑
∑
 (9) 
Looking at Figure 2 and 2bis an we realize that ( ), 1i y it∆ −  becomes greater than ,Di y T−∆  
even when bandwidths are not so large18, at least for the left distribution queue where 
                                                 
17 We observe also that HVCL may be positive even when all groups post-tax Gini indexes  are lower than the corresponding pre-tax 
ones, due two the different weight system: for lower incomes after tax weights should in fact be higher then the corresponding pre-
tax ones and the reverse should hold for higher incomes. 
18 We observe that ,
D
i y T−∆  is ,i y T−≤ ∆ , which helps to explain why H becomes negative much before than HAJL. 
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groups are more crowded, and, consequently, receive a weight which is heavier than in 
the right one. 
Table 3 reports the values for RE and APKR  decompositions, evaluated at bandwidths 
100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700 and 2,000; together with their standard errors 
obtained by 2,000 bootstrap replications. From the figures reported in the tables it stems 
that the ratios between the indexes and their standard errors are generally quite high, but 
those which concern ( )EGR R . The ratios ( ) { }EG EGR R SE R R range from 6.78 to 
8.13 when the bandwidth is 100 euros, from 0.75 to 2.20 when the bandwidth is 
enlarged up to 700 euros, and they are not greater than 1.36 when the bandwidth is 
2000. It is worth stressing that the 95% bootstrap percentiles are generally quite similar 
to those calculated assuming normality but those related to ( )EGR R ; this result is in 
line with UL findings: their simulations lead to the conclusion that the distribution for 
EGR  is asymmetric while the distributions for the other indexes they consider are 
symmetric and, moreover, that the bootstrap estimated standard error for EGR  is almost 
twice than that of the true distribution. Then we can conclude that the point estimates 
for RE components should be quite reliable. The same should hold for WGR R  and 
AJLR R ; ( )EGR R  stays apart, perhaps due its relatively small magnitude, but not only 
for this reason: WGR R  is small when the bandwidth is 100 euros, nevertheless it shows 
lower standard errors and bootstrap confidence intervals more similar to those obtained 
by the normal distribution. Some cautiousness should be adopted also for H when it 
assumes small absolute values. 
Tables 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE 
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5. On determining an “optimal” bandwidth 
 
VCL propose their decomposition with the idea that, in measuring the vertical effect by 
the pre-tax and post-tax distribution of group income averages, VVCL should eliminate 
either of measurement errors or anomalous values, by averaging within group incomes: 
of course, on one side the larger the groups are the more efficacious the smoothing 
performed by averaging is, but, on another side, the larger the groups are the less equals 
incomes are within groups. VCL suggest to choose the bandwidth which maximizes the 
potential redistributive effect. AJL appears to be quite appealing  for  the horizontal 
effect measure adopted: as we stressed in the previous paragraph, HAJL cannot result in 
being positive when all groups post-tax Gini indexes are lower than the corresponding 
pre-tax ones, which cannot be excluded at all for HVCL. 
H presents the undoubted advantage of been considered together RAPK and then not only 
with RAJL: however its interpretation is not straight as LU notice. 
Looking either at Figure 1 and 1bis in the present paper or to LU figures, we can see 
that, in correspondence of some bandwidths, the three potential redistributive effects are 
quite close, or even coincide. We would observe even closer values when the bandwidth 
tends to cover the whole income range: in this case, however, as already noticed, the 
three indexes would tend to zero and would not capture any potential vertical 
redistribution at all! 
We would then suggest to identify as “optimal” the bandwidth where (i) the maximum 
distance among V, VVCL and VAJL is minimum, (ii) provided that there the highest of V, 
VVCL and VAJL is not lower then the lowest among the global maxima that the three 
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indexes assume over the whole set of bandwidths ranging from zero to the maximum 
income spread. 
Figures 4 and 4bis ABOUT HERE 
If we consider the three distances ( )VCL EG SW Wy T yV V R G G−− = − − , AJL EGV V R− =  and 
( )VCL AJL SW Wy T yV V G G−− = − , looking at Figures 4 and 4bis, the minimum for the 
maximum of the distances is reached when ( )EG SW Wy T yR G G−= − , at a 300 euro 
bandwidth for individuals and at a 380 euro bandwidth for family equivalent incomes. 
The behavior shown by EGR  in our empirical analysis is confirmed also by LU analysis: 
when bandwidths become large group average re-rankings annihilates, soon or later, 
depending on tax fairness: for individuals EGR   becomes zero sooner then for families. 
If we go back to expression (5) we can understand that ( )SW Wy T yG G− −  is totally negligible 
for small bandwidths, where ( )2 2in n  results to be quite small and their sum is much 
less than 1 when bandwidths are tiny and then little crowded. As bandwidths increase, a 
more than proportional increase in ( )2 2in n  is not compensated by a convergence of the 
it  towards  their average t  and the difference between 
SW
y TG −  and 
W
yG  increases more 
than proportionally. Surely ( )SW Wy T yG G− −  is expected to decrease and to tend to zero as 
bandwidths enlarge, being lim limSW Wy T y yb MAX b MAXG G G−→ →= = , but, as already observed, when 
their difference reaches zero, V, VVCL and VAJL become much lower than RE, that is 
much lower than the global maximum of VAJL. 
Looking at individuals, for 280-300 euro bandwidths EG SW Wy T yR G G−= −  is 0.005% of 
RE, which means the 1.5% of the maximum value attained by EGR  (bandwidth 10 euro 
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large) and the 1% of the value attained by ( )SW Wy T yG G− −  at 3000 euro bandwidth; this 
explains why at a 280 euro bandwidth the three potential vertical redistribution indexes 
look to be equal. Bit larger percentages hold for family equivalent incomes 19: in Figure 
1bis the distance between VAJL and V=VVCL appears to be a little greater than that 
observed for individuals, even if, in any case, quite limited.  
Looking at Figures we can notice that the maximum for VAJL, the lowest among the 
three indexes, lies quite close to the point where VVCL crosses V, so we can confirm that 
according the suggested criteria, the bandwidth where EGR  crosses SW Wy T yG G− −  can be 
identified as optimal. Observe that AJL VCLV V≤  holds together with, AJLV V≤ , VVCL 
crosses V when the former is still increasing and the latter already decreasing, the global 
maximum for VAJL should fall, as it actually falls, between the bandwidth where the 
separation between VVCL and VAJL becomes evident, and the bandwidth where VVCL and 
V become no more distinguishible. 
We add that in our empirical analysis, in the interval between 250-370 euro, VAJL 
oscillates from 99.97% and 99.99% of the Reynolds-Smolensky index, for individual; 
for families the percentage ranges from  99.97% to 99.98% when the interval is 340-440 
euro: in a neighbourhood of the optimal bandwidth the three indexes absorb most of the 
total redistributive effect. We conclude observing that at the optimal bandwidth the 
horizontal loss measured by HVCL and HAJL is much lower than the loss due to 
overlapping among groups, measured by RAJL. 
                                                 
19 EGR and ( )SW Wy T yG G− −  represent the 0.012% of RE at the 400 euro bandwidth; which means the 2.3% of the maximum value 
attained by EGR  (bandwidth 10 euro large) and the 2.1% of the maximum attained by ( )SW Wy T yG G− − (bandwidth 3000 euro large). 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The original Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) decomposition of the redistributive 
effect considers groups of exact equals in portioning the whole pre-tax income 
distribution and restrict the analysis to the special cases in which the group averages and 
the within group orderings maintain the same ranking as before taxation. This means 
that the AJL decomposition of the redistributive effect considers only overlapping effect 
among groups of exact equals. 
As the following literature pointed out, exact equals are rare in the real world data, so 
that only groups with close pre-tax incomes can be considered. If this is the case, also 
the reranking of the mean post-tax income among groups and the reranking within 
groups must be considered. The intensity of the three possible rerankings here 
considered varies according to the bandwidth defining the close equals. Then a problem 
arises: an optimal bandwidth must be chosen in order to properly decompose the 
redistributive effect into vertical, horizontal and reranking effect. 
The choice of the optimal bandwidth is not obvious. Van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert 
(2001) individuate the optimal bandwidth that should be used in decomposing the 
redistributive effect as the Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) methodology suggests 
without considering the different contribution of the reranking of the mean post-tax 
income among groups and the reranking within groups. They suggest choosing as the 
optimal bandwidth the one which maximizes the ratio between the potential vertical 
effect and the actual redistributive effect. As the empirical analysis shows, this ratio 
may have more than one relative maximum and presents a layout which may be 
irregular, so that this condition is difficult to be applied in real data elaborations. 
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Lambert and Urban (2005) got though this problem by identifying a set of possible 
decompositions of the redistributive effect. They also notice that when close pre-tax 
equals groups instead of exact pre-tax ones are considered, the residual component in 
the original Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) model is not the Atkinson-Plotnick-
Kakwani index, but only one of its components, that is the one which measures group 
overlapping introduced by taxation. 
In this paper we use this decomposition of the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index, and 
intensively look to the empirical analysis in order to individuate the relationships among 
the main three possible decompositions of the redistributive effect analyzed by Lambert 
and Urban (2005). We suggest that the optimal bandwidth should be chosen where the 
maximum distance among the considered possible definitions of potential vertical effect 
is minimum, provided that the greatest of the three indexes is not lower than the global 
maximum assumed by the lowest of the three indexes over the whole income 
distribution range: the optimal bandwidth can be individuated at the point where the 
between group reranking index crosses the difference between the within group Gini 
indexes calculated, respectively, for the post-tax smoothed income parade and the pre-
tax one. We find empirical evidence that in this bandwidth neighborhood the three 
measures are also nearly converging and, moreover, absorb most of the Reynolds-
Smolenky total redistribution measure.  
 
 23
References 
 
Aronson R. J., Lambert P. J., (1993), “Inequality decomposition analysis and the Gini coefficient 
revisited”, The Economic Journal, 103, pp. 1221-1227. 
Aronson R. J., Lambert. P. J., (1994), “Decomposing the Gini coefficient to reveal the vertical, horizontal 
and reranking effects of income taxation”, National Tax Journal, 47, pp. 273-294. 
Aronson R. J., Johnson P. J., Lambert P. J., (1994), “Redistributive effect and unequal income tax 
treatment”, The Economic Journal, 104, pp. 262-270. 
Dagum C. (1997), “A new approach to the decomposition of Gini income inequality ratio”, Empirical 
Economics, 22, pp. 515-531. 
Ebert U., Moyes P., (2000), “Consistent income tax structures when households are heterogeneous”, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 90, pp. 116-150. 
Lambert P.J., Ramos X., (1997a), “Horizontal inequity and vertical redistribution”, International Tax and 
Public Finance, 4, pp. 25-37. 
Lambert P.J., Ramos X., (1997b), “Horizontal inequity and reranking”, Research on Economic Inequality, 
7, pp. 1-18. 
Pellegrino S., (2007a), “Struttura ed effetti redistributivi dell’imposta personale e italiana: il confronto 
2000-2005 ed un esercizio di modifica”, Economia Pubblica, 37, n. 1-2, pp. 99-143. 
Pellegrino S., (2007b), “Il Modello di microsimulazione IRPEF 2004”, SIEP, Italian Society of Public 
Economics, WP 583/07. 
Pellegrino S., (2007c), “IRPEF 2007: una redistribuzione (quasi) irrilevante?”, Rivista di Diritto 
Finanziario e Scienza delle Finanze, anno LXVI, fasc. 1, 2007, pp. 24-43. 
Urban I., Lambert P. J., (2008), “Redistribution, horizontal inequity and reranking: how to measure them 
properly”, Public Finance Review, 20, n. 10, pp.1-24. 
van de Ven J., Creedy J., Lambert P. J., (2001), “Close equals and calculation of the vertical, horizontal 
and reranking effects of taxation”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 63, pp. 381-394. 
Vernizzi A., (2007), “Una precisazione sulla scomposizione dell’indice di redistribuzione RE di Aronson-
Johnson-Lambert e una proposta di estensione dell’indice di Plotnick”, Economia Pubblica, 37, n. 1-
2, pp. 145-153, and DEAS, Università degli Studi di Milano, WP 2006-28. 
Vernizzi A., Pellegrino S. (2007), “On the Aronson-Johnson-Lambert decomposition of the redistributive 
effect”, DEAS, Università degli Studi di Milano, WP 2007-13. 
 
Table 1 Summary of index definitions  
Groups are constituted by subjects belonging to a same pre-tax income bracket; income brackets are 
created by splitting the pre-tax non decreasing incomes parade into contiguous intervals 
characterized by a same income spread. Groups contains the same subjects both before and 
after taxation, whatever ordering criterion is adopted. Before taxation no overlapping exists 
by construction; taxation may result in group overlapping.  
yG  Gini index for pre-tax income parade.  
B
yG  between groups Gini index for pre-tax income parade: it is defined as the Gini index when all incomes inside each group are substituted by the group income average.  
W
yG  within groups Gini index for pre-tax income parade:  , ,Wy k y k y
k
G a G=∑ , where ,k yG  is the 
Gini index for the k-th group and ,k ya  is the product of the k-th group  population share and 
pre-tax income share. 
y TG −  Gini index for post-tax income parade. 
B
y TG −  it is analog to ByG  for the post-tax income parade. 
W
y TG −  within groups Gini index for post-tax income parade:  , ,Wy T k y T k y T
k
G a G− − −=∑ , where 
,k y TG −  is the post-tax Gini index for the k-th group and ,k y Ta −  is the product of the k-th 
group population share and post-tax income share. 
y TD −  concentration index for post-tax income parade when ordered according to the pre-tax order. 
B
y TD −  between groups concentration index for post-tax income parade: it is defined as the concentration index when all incomes inside each group are substituted by the group income 
average, moreover groups are ordered according to pre-tax group averages. 
W
y TD −  within groups concentration index for post-tax income parade:  
, ,
W
y T k y T k y T
k
D a D− − −=∑ ; ,k y TD −  is the concentration index for the k-th group, when the k-th 
group incomes are ordered according to the pretax within group order, and ,k y Ta −  is the 
product of the k-th group population share and post-tax income share. 
SW
y TG −  within groups Gini index for post-tax smoothed income parade. Smoothed taxation consists 
in taxing all income in a group by the group average tax rate.  , ,
SW
y T k y T k y T
k
G a G− − −=∑ , as 
the Gini index for the k-th group remains unchanged, when all group incomes are taxed by a 
same tax rate. 
 
Table 2 Summary of equations and components 
VCL VCL AJLRE V H R= − −  
VCL B B
y y TV G G −= −  
VCL W W
y T yH G G−= −  
AJL t B W
y T y T y T y TR G G G G− − − −= = − −  
0 0 0
lim lim 0 e lim 0VCL VCL AJL
b b b
V RE H R→ → →= = =  
lim 0 lim e lim 0VCL VCL AJL
b MAX b MAX b MAX
V H RE R→ → →= = − =  
AJL AJL AJLRE V H R= − −  
( )
AJL B SW
y y T y T
VCL SW W
y T y
V G G G
V G G
− −
−
= − − =
= − −  
AJL W SW
y T y TH G G− −= −  
0 0 0
lim lim 0 e lim 0AJL AJL AJL
b b b
V RE H R→ → →= = =  
lim 0 lim e lim 0AJL AJL AJL
b MAX b MAX b MAX
V H RE R→ → →= = − =  
APKRE V H R= − −            
( )
( ) ( )
B SW
y y T y T
AJL B B
y T y T
VCL SW W B B
y T y y T y T
V G D G
V G D
V G G G D
− −
− −
− − −
= − − =
= + − =
= − − + −
 
W SW
y T y TH D G− −= −  
0 0
lim e lim 0y y Tb bV G D H−→ →= − =  
lim 0 e lim y T yb MAX b MAXV H D G−→ →= = −  
( )
( )
APK AJL EG WG
EG B B
y T y T
WG W W
y T y T
R R R R
R G D
R G D
− −
− −
= + +
= −
= −
  
0 0 0
lim 0 lim e lim 0AJL EG APK WG
b b b
R R R R→ → →= = =  
lim 0 lim 0 e limAJL EG WG APK
b MAX b MAX b MAX
R R R R→ → →= = =  
Figure 1:  V, VVCLand VAJL (%RE) - Individuals 
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Figure 1:  V, VVCLand VAJL (%RE) – Individuals (focus) 
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Figure 1 bis: V, VVCLand VAJL (%RE) – m(1) Households  
m(1) means Cutler scale α=0.50 β=0.65 and family weight = 1 
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Figure 1 bis: V, VVCLand VAJL (%RE) – m(1) Households (focus) 
m(1) means Cutler scale α=0.50 β=0.65 and family weight = 1 
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Figure 2: H, HVCLand HAJL with RAJL and RAPK (%RE) - Individuals  
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Figure 2 bis: H, HVCLand HAJL with RAJL and RAPK (%RE) - m(1) Households 
§ m(1) means Cutler scale α=0.50 β=0.65 and family weight = 1. 
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Figure 3: RAPK % decomposition - Individuals 
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Figure 3 bis: RAPK % decomposition – m(1) Households 
§ m(1) means Cutler scale α=0.50 β=0.65 and family weight = 1. 
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Table 3: RE decomposition – Individuals 
(bootstrap estimated standard errors in parentheses-2,000 replications) 
 
 
Component Bandwidths 
 100 300 400 500 600 700 2000 
% RE/Gy 
14.3699 14.3699 14.3699 14.3699 14.3699 14.3699 14.3699 
(0.1266) (0.1266) (0.1266) (0.1266) (0.1266) (0.1266) (0.1266) 
% ( )VCLV RE  101.0357 101.0835 101.0858 101.0890 101.0878 101.0855 101.0039 (0.0381) (0.0388) (0.0390) (0.0392) (0.0397) (0.0392) (0.0380) 
% ( )V RE  101.0847 101.0806 101.0762 101.0723 101.0634 101.0537 100.7546 (0.0395) (0.0387) (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0398) (0.0390) (0.0375) 
% ( )VCLH RE  0.0759 0.2057 0.2621 0.3157 0.3628 0.4065 0.6713 (0.0025) (0.0064) (0.0083) (0.0098) (0.0115) (0.0126) (0.0232) 
% ( )H RE  0.0022 0.0063 0.0107 0.0146 0.0235 0.0332 0.3323 (0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0222) 
% ( )AJLR RE  0.9598 0.8778 0.8237 0.7733 0.7250 0.6789 0.3325 (0.0349) (0.0334) (0.0316) (0.0307) (0.0283) (0.0270) (0.0170) 
% ( )APKR RE  1.0871 1.0871 1.0871 1.0871 1.0871 1.0871 1.0871 (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) 
% ( )AJL APKR R  88.2865 80.7452 75.7697 71.1290 66.6890 62.4498 30.5890 (0.5885) (0.4274) (0.4252) (0.4923) (0.5651) (0.5982) (0.8749) 
% ( )EG APKR R  4.5962 0.2900 0.1338 0.1116 0.0669 0.0669 0.0000 (0.6003) (0.3100) (0.1310) (0.1115) (0.0549) (0.0495) (0.0146) 
% ( )WG APKR R  7.1174 18.9648 24.0964 28.7595 33.2441 37.4833 69.4110 (0.1467) (0.3454) (0.4105) (0.5073) (0.5693) (0.6197) (0.9081) 
Source: Own elaborations.       
Table 4: RE decomposition – Households 
(bootstrap estimated standard errors in parentheses-2,000 replications) 
 
 
Component Bandwidths 
  100 300 400 500 600 700 2000 
% RE/Gy 
13.9266 13.9266 13.9266 13.9266 13.9266 13.9266 13.9266 
(0.1910) (0.1910) (0.1910) (0.1910) (0.1910) (0.1910) (0.1910) 
% ( )VCLV RE  101.2702 101.3349 101.3201 101.3300 101.3330 101.3351 101.2527 (0.0543) (0.0574) (0.0577) (0.0574) (0.0575) (0.0565) (0.0565) 
% ( )V RE  101.3468 101.3412 101.3217 101.3193 101.3129 101.3079 100.9817 (0.0606) (0.0577) (0.0574) (0.0585) (0.0592) (0.0592) (0.0574) 
% ( )VCLH RE  0.1001 0.2718 0.3422 0.4078 0.4664 0.5245 0.8316 (0.0040) (0.0106) (0.0136) (0.0158) (0.0188) (0.0202) (0.0335) 
% ( )H RE  0.0016 0.0072 0.0266 0.0290 0.0354 0.0405 0.3667 (0.0017) (0.0044) (0.0061) (0.0074) (0.0091) (0.0101) (0.0313) 
% ( )AJLR RE  1.1701 1.0622 0.9780 0.9217 0.8666 0.8106 0.4210 (0.0504) (0.0486) (0.0453) (0.0433) (0.0420) (0.0394) (0.0246) 
% ( )APKR RE  1.3486 1.3486 1.3486 1.3486 1.3486 1.3486 1.3486 (0.0605) (0.0605) (0.0605) (0.0605) (0.0605) (0.0605) (0.0605) 
% ( )AJL APKR R  86.7615 78.7591 72.5153 68.3462 64.2561 60.1067 31.2191 (0.7555) (0.5072) (0.5598) (0.6584) (0.6792) (0.7271) (1.0030) 
% ( )EG APKR R  5.7103 1.0275 0.9484 0.5928 0.4347 0.4742 0.0395 (0.8019) (0.3685) (0.3194) (0.2602) (0.1983) (0.2152) (0.0384) 
% ( )WG APKR R  7.5282 20.2134 26.5363 31.0611 35.3092 39.4191 68.7414 (0.1758) (0.4143) (0.5429) (0.6269) (0.6628) (0.7425) (0.9690) 
Source: Own elaborations.       
Figure 4: REG and SW Wy T yG G− −  in percentage of RE – Individuals 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
R
EG
   
G
W
sy
t -
 G
W
y
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2800 3000
Bandwidth
REG GWsyt_GWy
 
Figure 4 bis: REG and SW Wy T yG G− −  in percentage of RE – m(1) Households 
§ m(1) means Cutler scale α=0.50 β=0.65 and family weight = 1. 
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